I. INTRODUCTION

M
ultinational corporations have a number of ways to lower their tax liabilities. Two methods of tax avoidance that receive a great deal of attention are transferpricing manipulation and the strategic use of debt. Both methods allow a corporation to lower its total corporate tax liability by shifting profits from affiliates that face high corporate tax rates to affiliates that face lower corporate tax rates. While the use of each method of profit shifting has been studied in some depth, little is known about the relationship between the two methods. This paper examines the relationship between those two methods of profit shifting by looking at what happens when one method becomes more costly.
In thinking about how corporations decide between the two methods of profit shifting discussed in this paper there are three main possibilities: (1) Certain characteristics of corporate structure, industry, and the types of assets being sold within the multinational might mean that a corporation would choose to use either transfer-pricing manipulation or intercompany debt to move profits to lower-tax affiliates, but not both; (2) Corporations use some combination of the two methods to move profits, but there is no relationship between the use of the two methods; and (3) The amount being shifted through one method is a factor in the decision regarding the other.
If firms only use one of the methods of profit shifting, or if shifting through transferpricing manipulation and debt are unrelated, then a change in the cost of one method should have no effect on the use of the other. If there is a relationship between the amount shifted through transfer-pricing manipulation and the amount shifted through intercompany debt, then that relationship may be characterized in one of two ways. If transfer-pricing manipulation and intercompany debt are substitutes, then, as the cost of one method increases, the use of the other method should increase. That relationship could arise if enforcement efforts by tax authorities focus on firms with unexpectedly low profits, in which case the cost of shifting profits through one method would be increasing in the total amount shifted. If the methods are substitutes, then, when a country increases the stringency of rules to prevent profit shifting through intercompany debt, that policy will reduce profit shifting through debt, but will increase profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation. If transfer-pricing manipulation and debt are complements, then, as the cost of one method increases, the use of the other method should decrease. That relationship could arise if an increase in the cost of one method results in the corporation deciding that it is no longer optimal to invest as much in tax planning services, which could reduce the quantity of shifting through the other method. For firms that use both methods, it seems likely that there is a relationship between the amounts shifted. A corporation that has invested in tax efficiency along one dimension will probably have invested in tax efficiency along other dimensions. Although it may seem most intuitive for the two methods to be substitutes, the direction of that relationship can only be established empirically.
Across countries, there appears to be a growing perception that multinational corporations are avoiding paying their fair share of taxes. That has led to efforts in many countries to make profit shifting more costly. Those efforts, however, often focus on a single method of tax avoidance. The comprehensive approach of the OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative, on the other hand, appears to assume that different methods of shifting are related.
1 Understanding the degree of substitutability between methods of profit shifting has important implications for those policies. If there is no relationship between the methods, then an increase in the cost of one method should have no effect on the amount shifted through the other. If the methods are substitutes, however, then an increase in the cost of one method should cause corporations to shift toward increased use of the other. That means that policies that are targeted at a single method may have a limited effect on firms' actual corporate tax payments. This paper presents a simple model that captures the different possible relationships between methods of profit shifting. For each, the expected relationship between the cost of one method of shifting and the amount shifted through each method is discussed. To examine the relationship between methods of shifting, this paper uses affiliate-level panel data from the ORBIS database on reported earnings before interest and taxes. The empirical results consider how changes in policies designed to make shifting through debt more costly have affected earnings before interest and taxes. Earnings before interest and taxes is used as the dependent variable because it will capture profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation, but not profit shifting through debt. The results provide some evidence that corporations treat transfer-pricing manipulation and intercompany debt as substitutes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides some background information on transfer-pricing manipulation and intercompany debt. Section III develops a simple theoretical framework for considering the relationship between profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation and profit shifting through debt. Section IV discusses the data used to examine the relationship between methods of profit shifting. Section V contains the empirical results and Section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A multinational corporation with affiliates located across different countries has an incentive to move profits from higher-tax affiliates to lower-tax affiliates. There are two important methods that a multinational can use to move profits. The first method is transfer-pricing manipulation, where a corporation uses transactions between affiliates to shift profits. When goods and services are transferred between members of a multinational corporation, then those transactions must be valued so that each member of the multinational can establish its taxable profits. If a high-tax affiliate sells a good or service to a lower-tax affiliate at a price that understates the true value, then that will reduce the reported profits of the higher-tax affiliate and increase the reported profits of the lower-tax affiliate. The price that is set is referred to as the transfer price. Such related-party transactions are supposed to occur at "arm's length" prices, i.e., the price that would be set if the transaction occurred between two unrelated parties, but difficulty in establishing what that price should be results in an opportunity for profit shifting. The second method used for shifting profits is intercompany debt. The opportunity for profit shifting through debt arises from the fact that most countries treat debt differently from equity. If a lower-tax affiliate makes a loan to a higher-tax affiliate, then the interest payments on that loan are generally deductible from the profits of the higher-tax affiliate. That allocation of internal debt lowers the multinational corporation's total corporate tax liability.
There is a significant literature establishing that corporations shift profits through both transfer-pricing manipulation and debt. For example, Grubert and Mutti (1991) , Hines and Rice (1994) , and have established that the distribution of profits across the affiliates of a multinational corporation responds to corporate tax rate differentials. Clausing (2003) focuses on the prices used in intra-firm trade flows and finds evidence consistent with profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation. Other papers have focused on isolating profit shifting through internal debt. For example, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) , Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) , and Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème (2008) have found a relationship between the tax rate in a multinational affiliate's home country and its level of debt. The last of those papers also finds a relationship between a firm's capital structure and the tax differential between that firm's home country and the home countries of its affiliates. Those findings alone, however, do not provide evidence of profit shifting through debt, as the relationship between capital leverage and corporate tax rates may simply reflect the tax preference for debt that is present in most countries. Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) study profit shifting using data on pretax profit, which will capture both profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation and profit shifting through intercompany debt. When they focus on earnings before interest and taxes instead -which only captures shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation -they find a much smaller effect, which suggests that internal debt is the main margin for profit shifting for the firms in their sample. Buettner and Wamser (2013) use panel data on German multinationals to find evidence that internal debt is used more heavily by firms that have low-tax affiliates, which suggests that internal debt is being used to shift profits.
Across countries, a variety of policy changes have likely had an effect on the cost of shifting through the two methods. There have been efforts to make transfer-pricing manipulation more costly. Those efforts have generally focused on requiring increased justification for the prices used, often implemented through increased transfer-pricing documentation requirements. Some countries have also devoted increased resources towards examining the transfer prices that multinational corporations use. Rules focused on preventing profit shifting through interest payments have used a number of different approaches. The most general form of limitation is to simply state that debt arrangements must occur at "arm's length," both in terms of the interest rate set and the amount of debt made available. Initially, specific limits on interest deductions generally focused on setting a maximum allowable debt-to-equity ratio. Those rules were frequently referred to as "thin capitalization" rules and often applied specifically to related-party debt. More recently, a number of countries, including France, Germany, and Italy, have moved towards limiting the percentage of profit that can be taken as an interest deduction. Those rules, sometimes referred to as earnings stripping rules, often apply to all interest payments, not just interest payments to related parties. There have also been changes in source-country imposed withholding taxes on interest payments. While some countries have eliminated their withholding taxes on interest payments, which should make profit shifting through intercompany debt less costly, others have implemented them for the first time. Changes in withholding taxes are not currently included in this paper. Major changes to withholding taxes on interest at the European Union level also took place prior to the sample period used for empirical analysis.
A small number of papers have studied the effects of regulations targeted at reducing a given type of profit shifting. Those papers have generally focused on the effect of the regulations on the amount of profit shifting that occurs through that method. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) , Lohse and Riedel (2013) , and Beer and Loeprick (2015) all find evidence that increased transfer-pricing regulation makes a firm's profits less responsive to tax differentials. Klassen and Laplante (2012) find that a loosening of transfer-pricing regulation in the United States was associated with greater shifting to low-tax affiliates.
Several papers have focused on how changes to German thin-capitalization rules have affected the debt leverage of German multinationals. Wamser (2008) finds that the implementation of a lower debt-to-equity ratio in Germany in 2001 resulted in increased use of external debt. Overesch and Wamser (2010) find a negative effect of German thin-capitalization rules on internal debt. Buettner, et al. (2012) look at the foreign subsidiaries of German multinationals. They find evidence that tightening thincapitalization rules reduces the use of internal loans for tax planning, but they also find evidence that tightened thin-capitalization rules result in increased use of external debt, suggesting some degree of substitution between internal and external debt. Blouin, et al. (2014) use data on the internal and total leverage of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals and find that thin-capitalization rules have a significant effect on the capital structure of multinational firms. They find that restrictions in an affiliate's home country on the total debt-to-equity ratio have a significant effect on total debt and that restrictions on the related-party debt-to-equity ratio have a significant effect on relatedparty debt. They additionally explore heterogeneity across countries, looking both at the treatment of disallowed interest deductions and at if the disallowance of interest is automatic or if it can be overruled. They find evidence that stricter rules reduce debt leverage and that leverage responds quickly to changes in restrictions.
III. MODEL
Consider the simple example of a multinational corporation composed of two firms, a high-tax affiliate and a low-tax affiliate.
2 The high-tax affiliate earns taxable income before shifting of p H and the low-tax affiliate earns taxable income before shifting of p L . The multinational can shift profits from the high-tax affiliate to the low-tax affiliate. It has two ways of shifting profits, transfer-pricing manipulation and intercompany debt. The amount shifted through transfer-pricing manipulation is represented by S T and the amount shifted through debt is represented by S D . The cost of shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation is C T and the cost of shifting through debt is C D . Those costs are assumed to be fully deductible and are deducted in the higher-tax country.
The cost of shifting profits through transfer-pricing manipulation is assumed to depend on the enforcement efforts aimed at making transfer-pricing manipulation more costly, E T . That component of the cost function is likely to largely depend on rules implemented by the high-tax country, but could also depend on the rules implemented in the lower-tax country.
3 Similarly, the cost of shifting profits through debt is assumed to depend on rules put in place to make shifting through debt more costly, E D . That variable can also depend on rules implemented in both countries, but is likely to depend heavily on the rules implemented in the higher-tax country. Rules targeted at profit shifting through debt tend to focus on limiting the amount of interest that can be deducted or the ratio of debt to equity. The low-tax affiliate will be receiving the interest payments, so rules on the deduction of interest payments or on the amount of debt held by the low-tax affiliate will not affect the multinational's ability to move profits to the low-tax affiliate.
The multinational corporation will seek to maximize after-tax profits
For simplicity, taxable income before shifting is assumed to be positive in both countries. There are two possible forms for the cost functions: (1) The cost of shifting through a given method only depends on the amount shifted through that method and not on the total amount shifted; or (2) The cost of shifting through a given method depends on both the amount shifted through that method and the amount shifted through the second method, i.e., the cost depends on the total amount shifted. A number of countries state that transfer-pricing audits can be triggered by a firm reporting unexpectedly low profits relative to comparable firms or past years. That type of trigger could be captured by a cost function that is increasing in the total amount shifted. If the cost of each form of shifting depends only on the amount shifted through that method, then the optimal amount of shifting through transfer pricing is determined by
and the optimal amount of profit shifting through debt is determined by
For purposes of this paper, the empirical focus will be on how changes in the cost of shifting through debt affect the amount that is shifted through transfer-pricing manipulation. For the cost functions above, however, symmetry implies that the analysis would be the same for the relationship between the cost of shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation and the amount shifted through intercompany debt.
If E D increases then there will be no change in C T and therefore no change in S T *. The new optimal level of shifting through debt must satisfy
The change in the cost of shifting through debt will be
The empirical section of this paper will use information on affiliate-level earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to examine the relationship between shifting through debt and shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation. For the high-tax affiliate, EBIT is determined by
and for the lower-tax affiliate, EBIT is determined by
Consider then, under this first scenario where the cost of shifting through method i depends only on the amount shifted through method i, what would happen if a rule is implemented in the higher-tax (denoted by an H subscript) country to make profit shifting through debt more costly
The only effect of a change in the interest deduction limitations on the EBIT of the high-tax affiliate is through the change in the cost of shifting through intercompany debt. If the change in that cost is small in response to the increase in enforcement, then the effect on the EBIT of the high-tax affiliate will be small. Limitations on profit shifting through debt often take the form of firm cutoffs on the amount of debt that can be held or the amount of interest that can be deducted. A change in that cutoff will change the upper bound on intercompany debt, but will likely have little effect on the marginal cost of shifting through debt. To the extent that it is costly to rearrange affairs to adjust to the new maximum level of debt, there might be an increase in cost associated with the policy, but the change in the total cost of shifting through debt would likely be small. The initial implementation of a limit on the debt-to-equity ratio or of a limit on the amount of interest that can be deducted relative to profit would likely have a larger effect on C D .
The above assumes that restrictions on debt only affect the profit shifting activity of the firm while leaving its true operations unchanged. If the debt limit forces the corporation to also adjust its operations in non-optimal ways, then it is possible that increased restrictions on interest deductions would reduce true earnings and, therefore, reduce both EBIT H and EBIT L . That effect could be more of concern for policies that limit total debt.
The second possibility is that the cost of shifting using a given method depends on both the amount shifted through that method and the amount shifted through other methods. It could be the case, for example, that the cost of profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation is increasing in both the gap between the "arm's length" price and the price that is being set and in the gap between a firm's reported and true profits. An increase in the amount shifted through debt would reduce the amount that could be shifted through transfer-pricing manipulation, as transfer prices would face additional scrutiny if the firm reports very low profits. That relationship is potentially less likely in the other direction. Limitations on debt generally focus on allowing a certain level of debt relative to equity or on allowing interest deductions up to a specific percentage of profit. If an affiliate is already subject to those debt limits, then reduced shifting through transfer pricing may not allow for increased shifting through debt. 4 When both cost functions depend on the total amount shifted, optimal shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation is determined by
and optimal profit shifting through debt is determined by
While the precise relationship between S T * and S D * will be determined by the forms of the cost functions, the general relationship between earnings before interest and taxes and changes in restrictions on debt will be
If there is a relationship between shifting through debt and shifting through transferpricing manipulation, then a change in the cost of shifting through debt will affect the EBIT of the lower-tax affiliate. If transfer-pricing manipulation and debt are substitutes, i.e., the cross price elasticity is positive, then an increase in the cost of shifting through debt will result in increased shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation. That will cause the EBIT of the low-tax affiliate to increase and the EBIT of the high-tax affiliate to decrease. If transfer-pricing and debt manipulation are complements, i.e., the cross price elasticity is negative, then an increase in the cost of shifting through debt will result in decreased shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation. That will cause the EBIT of the lower-tax affiliate to decrease and the EBIT of the higher-tax affiliate to increase. To the extent that rearranging the debt structure of the multinational affects pre-shifting profits, it is possible that an increase in interest deductions limitations in the higher-tax country will reduce and therefore reduce EBIT L . Table 1 summarizes the expected response to a change in policy in the higher-tax country that makes profit shifting through debt more costly. The first column indicates the response that would be observed if there is no relationship between shifting through debt and shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation, the second column indicates the responses that would be seen if shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation is a substitute for shifting through debt, and the third column indicates the response that would occur if shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation and shifting through debt are complements. The table assumes that limitations on interest deductions do not affect the pre-shifting profits of the corporation. Given this possible negative effect of increased regulation, it would seem that the clearest evidence for substitution across methods would be indications of a positive relationship between E H D and EBIT L . Under either scenario, it is possible that the cost of one method may be prohibitively high, and therefore all shifting by the multinational corporation would occur through a single method. For example, if the price of the only good sold between the two affiliates is easily determined, transfer-pricing manipulation is not a real option. If the corporation shifts profits, it will use debt to do so. Empirically, that scenario would be hard to distinguish from the scenario where the amounts shifted through debt and transfer-pricing manipulation are unrelated.
In reality, there is likely a great deal of heterogeneity across firms. Some multinationals will be able to use both methods of shifting. For others, the industry or structure of the multinational will mean that it uses only one method of shifting, or that it does not shift profits at all. The empirical results in this paper estimate a single coefficient for the multinationals in the sample. The existence of firms that are not using both methods will push the estimated response of EBIT to changes in E H D towards zero, i.e., toward finding that there is no relationship between the methods. A near zero coefficient could, for example, mask a great deal of substitution between methods for the subset of corporations that are able to utilize both methods. In order to determine the magnitude 
IV. DATA
One way to see if corporations treat transfer-pricing manipulation and debt as substitute methods of profit shifting is to examine the relationship between changes in the cost (or price) of profit shifting through debt and the amount of shifting that occurs through transfer-pricing manipulation. Earnings before interest and taxes as reported in corporations' financial statements will capture profit shifting that occurs through transfer-pricing manipulation, but will not include profit shifting that occurs through debt. That approach assumes that, as a first step, the use of internal debt for tax minimization responds to changes in rules governing interest deductions. 5 The following describes the sources for firm-level financial information, information on changes in policies that affect interest deduction, and other control variables of interest.
The availability of panel data on firm-level variables allows for a firm fixed-effects estimation strategy, where changes in fixed tangible assets and the cost of employees can be used as a proxy for changes in pre-shifting profits.
6 While the fixed-effects estimation strategy controls for unobservable firm characteristics, the shortcoming of the strategy is that it is only possible to estimate the effect of interest deduction limitations that change within a country over the sample period. Thus the results reflect the response to changes in policy within a country, rather than the effects of differences in policies across countries. There is more variation across countries than there is within a country over time, but moving away from the fixed-effects strategy to estimate the effects of those differences across countries would raise concerns about omitted variables.
A. Firm-level Data
The Bureau van Dijk ORBIS database is used to obtain information on a sample of multinational corporations. ORBIS is a firm-level dataset that collects information from national and local accounts. It currently contains financial information on more than 150 million corporations. Given that this paper focuses on profit shifting, the sample is limited to the subset of almost 1.5 million corporations that have at least one foreign shareholder or subsidiary with an ownership link of at least 50 percent. 7 The 50 5 In future work, it would be informative to also collect information on the debt of firms in the sample to see if there is in fact a relationship between the measures of limitations on interest deduction that are used and the level of debt. 6 This assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital and labor. This method is used to proxy for earned profits in Hines and Rice (1994) , , and other papers in the profit-shifting literature. 7 Ownership information is static, so changes in the locations of subsidiaries and shareholders cannot be tracked.
percent cutoff is used as a proxy for some degree of control by the parent corporation. Additionally, changes in profit shifting between affiliates can only be captured through unconsolidated financial accounts, i.e., financial accounts that report earnings, assets, and labor on an affiliate-by-affiliate basis rather than for the multinational as a whole. Profits being moved from one affiliate to another would not show up in consolidated reports. Firms that only have consolidated financial reports available are dropped from the sample. That restriction results in a sample of less than 600,000 firms. Of the remaining firms, another approximately 300,000 are eliminated because the required financial information is not available. Almost all U.S. firms are eliminated due to a lack of financial information. The data restrictions result in a sample of firms that are largely located in the European Union. A firm is included in the sample in any year in which its EBIT, tangible assets, and cost of employees are all available and positive. Years in which firms have negative EBIT are excluded, as the incentives for profit shifting are no longer necessarily based on tax differentials when a firm has losses.
8 Additionally, information is collected on each firm's industry, which allows for the inclusion of industry-by-year fixed effects to account for economic fluctuations over time across sectors.
Firm-level data are available for years between 2003 and 2012. The firms in the initial sample are distributed across 55 countries, with large numbers of firms located in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, and Romania. Firms have between 1 and 218 foreign affiliates. The mean number of foreign subsidiaries is 0.6 and the median is 0. The mean number of foreign shareholders is 0.9 and the median number is 1.0. Of the 87,843 firms included in the sample in 2010, 3,913 of the firms have both a foreign shareholder and a foreign subsidiary, 20,985 have only foreign subsidiaries, and 62,945 have only foreign shareholders. The shareholders and subsidiaries of the firms in the sample are widely distributed, with heavy concentrations in Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the time the information was collected, only some financial reports for 2012 had been collected, so only 41,656 firms have financial information available in 2012.
B. Information on Limits to Interest Deductions
There are three main ways in which countries limit interest deductions. A country can limit the allowable debt-to-equity ratio for a firm, it can limit the percentage of profits that can be deducted as interest (earnings stripping rules), or it can require that loans occur at "arm's length" where that can refer to both the interest rate used and the amount of debt made available. For each year between 2003 and 2013 the following information was collected for a set of 38 countries: (1) If there is a limit on the allowable debt-equity ratio in place (where the variable Thin Cap Rule takes a value of 1 if there is a limit in place, and takes a value of 0 otherwise), the allowable debt-to-equity ratio (where the variable Safe Harbor is equal to the share of assets that can be financed by debt if there is a limit in place, i.e., a ratio of 4:1 results in a value of 0.8, and is missing if Thin Cap Rule=0); (2) If there is a limit on the share of profit that can be deducted as interest, i.e., an "earnings stripping" rule (where the variable ES Rule takes a value of 1 if there is a limit in place, and takes a value of 0 otherwise); and (3) If there is an "arm's length" standard in place for interest deductions (where the variable Specific AL takes a value of 1 if the arm's length standard explicitly mentions interest transactions, and a value of 0 otherwise). That information is obtained from Ernst & Young (2004 -2014 . Currently, information on interest deduction limits is missing for less than 2 percent of the firms included in the sample, but that information is missing for nearly a quarter of the firms' foreign affiliates. In the future, additional information could be collected to better match the geographic distribution of the foreign affiliates of firms in the sample.
In the first year, 18 of the 38 countries had explicit debt-to-equity ratio limits in place, none of the countries had an earnings stripping rule in place, and 12 explicitly stated that loans must occur at arm's length. In 2013, 18 countries had explicit limits on allowable debt-to-equity ratios (with some new countries having adopted a limit and other countries having switched from debt-to-equity limits to earnings stripping rules), 10 had earnings stripping rules in place, and 17 explicitly stated that loans must occur at arm's length. In the future, information on interest deduction limitations could be expanded to include factors such as the imposition of withholding taxes on interest payments and the treatment of disallowed interest payments.
Simply looking at the existence of rules masks a great deal of variation across countries in terms of the implementation of those rules. Some countries apply thin-capitalization limits only to shareholder loans, others only to related-party loans, and others apply those rules to all loans. Some countries allow firms to show that their level of debt is reasonable relative to their corporate group or industry, while others rules are automatic without any consideration for the position of the firm relative to its peers. While these details can be very important, the lack of variation within a country over time means that they are not included in the analysis at this time.
One additional source of variation in thin capitalization rules over time that could be important is how thin capitalization rules were changed in response to the 2003 European Court of Justice decision in the Lankhorst-Hohorst Case. That case established that thin capitalization rules in place in Germany that applied only to nonresident firms were a barrier to the freedom of establishment. A number of countries in the European Union changed their thin-capitalization rules between 2003 and 2005, with some member states extending their rules so that they would also apply to residents, and others exempting EU resident firms from their thin capitalization rules. Those changes, however, occurred outside of the period used for the analysis in this paper; de la Feria and Fuest (2011) provide a detailed discussion of the effect of that ruling.
C. Other Variables
If changes to factors that affect the cost of profit shifting through debt occur as a component of broader corporate tax reform, then it is possible that the cost of profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation will also change. To control for that possibility, all empirical results include the variable TP Risk (available for the years between 2006 and 2012), which is a weighted measure that captures the existence of various types of transfer-pricing rules in a given country in a given year. It includes factors such as if a country requires disclosure of related-party transactions, if a country has transfer-pricing documentation requirements in place, if a tax agency can use secret comparables, and a measure of enforcement strictness. The measure can be calculated for 37 countries in 2006 and 53 countries in 2012. The measure is missing for approximately 15 percent of the sample in 2006 and for approximately 7 percent of the sample in 2012 (Mescall and Klassen (2014) and Saunders-Scott (2014) provide more detail on the measure). Future work could also control for other rule changes, such as the tax treatment of royalties, which might affect the ability of firms to shift profits.
Changes in economic conditions across countries over time are controlled for with the inclusion of the log of GDP per capita and the log of GDP per capita squared. A measure of government deficit is included to control for the possibility that tighter rules might be implemented in periods where earnings and therefore tax collections are already falling. In that case, a negative relationship between EBIT and tighter rules could simply capture the continuation of that downward trend. Both of those variables are obtained from the World Bank database.
V. RESULTS
The empirical results focus on the implementation of thin-capitalization limits and earnings stripping rules. It is not possible to examine the effect of implementing requirements for loans to occur at "arm's length," as all changes to arm's length based rules happen either prior to 2006 or after 2012. The transfer-pricing enforcement measure, TP Risk, is only available from 2006 to 2012, so there is no variation in the application of those rules over the period studied. That also makes it impossible to analyze the effect of changes in rules after the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling.
The simple model presented in Section III focuses on the response of firms located in higher-tax countries to changes in interest deduction rules in their home-country, as well as the response of firms located in lower-tax countries to changes in interest deduction rules in the home countries of its higher-tax affiliates. Responses to changes in own-country interest deduction limitations are considered in Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 looks at the response of EBIT L to changes in interest deduction limitations in the home countries of higher-tax affiliates.
The first column of Table 2 considers the response of EBIT to the implementation or removal of thin-capitalization rules. While the initial implementation of thincapitalization rules is likely a tightening of interest deduction limitations, many of the changes to thin-capitalization rules over the sample period are driven by countries dropping their thin-capitalization rules in favor of earnings stripping rules. In that context, the removal of thin-capitalization rules may actually imply a tightening of interest deduction limitations. Simply including a dummy variable for thin-capitalization rules generates a positive coefficient, but may reflect those types of changes being equivalent to a tightening of rules. The second column only includes firms that do not face an earnings stripping rule. That results in a negative coefficient, which would be consistent with firms substituting between methods of profit shifting. The coefficient suggests that the implementation of a thin-capitalization rule is associated with a 5.1 percent reduction in EBIT.
9 That is similar in magnitude to the estimated effect of a 7 percentage point increase in the country's statutory corporate tax rate. The third column includes a dummy variable for if the firm's home country has earnings stripping rules in place in a given year. There again appears to be a negative relationship between the tightening of interest deduction limitations and EBIT, with the implementation of an earnings stripping rule reducing EBIT by approximately 3.8 percent. While Columns 2 and 3 are consistent with substitution across methods of profit shifting, it is also possible that the negative coefficients reflect increases in the costs associated with profit shifting or decreases in true profits due to non-optimal capital structures. As discussed in Section III, incremental changes to interest deduction limitations are less likely to have a large effect on the cost of shifting through debt. Column 4 looks at the response to changes in safe harbor debt-to-equity ratios over time in countries that have a thin capitalization rule in place for at least one year between 2006 and 2012. A reduction in the Safe Harbor variable is equivalent to a tightening of interest deduction limitations. The regression does not result in the positive coefficient that would be expected if the methods are substitutes, but it should be interpreted cautiously as only three countries changed their safe harbors over the sample period.
If the relationship between EBIT and interest deduction limitations is being driven by substitution across methods, then the response should differ between firms that are shifting profits and those that do not. The existence of firms that do not shift profits or that cannot use both methods of profit shifting will push the overall coefficient towards zero.
The first two columns of Table 3 attempt to proxy for the division between firms that can shift profits and those that cannot by separately estimating the response for Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported earnings before interest and taxes. Thin Cap Rule takes a value of 1 if the firm's home country has debt-to-equity limitations in place in a given year and a value of 0 otherwise. ES Rule takes a value of 1 if the firm's home country has a limit on the share of profits that a firm can deduct as interest. Safe Harbor represents the debt-to-equity limit in place in a given year, i.e., for a country that limits debt-to-equity to a 4:1 ratio this variable would be equal to 0.80. TP Risk is the weighted sum of transfer-pricing regulations discussed in Section IV. Corp Tax Rate is the statutory corporate tax rate (including local taxes) in the firm's home country. Log Assets is the log of fixed tangible assets. Log Labor is the log of the cost of employees. firms that do not have any lower-tax affiliates. 10 Those firms presumably would not be engaged in outward profit shifting. The subset of firms with lower-tax affiliates will, however, still contain a large number of firms that either do not shift profits or are not able to use both methods of shifting. The first column, which looks at the effect of thincapitalization rules for firms that do not face an earnings stripping rule, exhibits the difference in behavior that would be expected. The second column, however, suggests that earnings stripping rules have an even larger negative effect on the reported EBIT of firms that do not have lower-tax affiliates. While surprising, that result may reflect the application of earnings stripping rules to total debt, not just related-party debt. Those rules can affect the debt structure of firms that do not have any related-party transactions. It is not immediately clear, however, why the effect would be larger for firms with no lower-tax affiliates; such firms are smaller, so the findings could reflect smaller firms being more dependent on debt. Ideally, it would be possible to compare the effect of earnings stripping rules that only apply to related-party interest payments to earnings stripping rules that apply to total interest payments, but unfortunately there are not enough examples of earnings stripping rules that only apply to related-party interest payments to identify the differential effect on corporations that do not have lower-tax affiliates.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 separate the sample into firms that are the ultimate owner of their corporate group and those that are not. As discussed earlier, shifting profit out of the headquarters of a multinational might be different from shifting profit out of a subsidiary. The results, however, do not seem to indicate any clear difference in response between firms that are the headquarters of their multinational group and those that are not. Table 4 considers the effect of changes in interest deduction limitations in the home countries of a firm's higher-tax affiliates to capture how EBIT L responds to E H D . The first column includes all firms that have at least one higher-tax affiliate and looks at how the implementation of earnings stripping rules in the home countries of those highertax affiliates affects the firm's EBIT. The variable of interest is simply the unweighted average of ES Rule across those higher-tax affiliates. The second column is similar, but instead focuses on firms that have at least one higher-tax shareholder. The results are qualitatively consistent with the methods of profit shifting being substitutes, but the results are not statistically significant. As the unweighted average may not accurately weight the relative importance of interest deduction limitations across the home countries of higher-tax affiliates, the third and fourth columns replicate the same regressions, but only include firms that have a single higher-tax affiliate and a single higher-tax shareholder respectively. The response to the implementation of an earnings stripping rule in the home country of a firm's higher-tax shareholder is positive and weakly statistically significant. Currently, information on interest deduction limitations is not included for a significant number of the countries in which higher-tax affiliates are located. Future work would expand the coverage of that measure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Whether different methods of tax minimization are substitutes is an interesting question, as changes to laws and regulations often focus on cutting down on one form of tax avoidance while leaving others unchanged. If corporations respond to those changes by making increased use of other methods of tax avoidance, then that response needs to be considered when analyzing the effect of policy changes. Intuitively, it seems that corporations should treat profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation and profit shifting through debt as substitutes. The results found in this paper are consistent with that intuition, but further work with more detailed data remains to be done.
One direction for future research is to create an index that better captures the multiple dimensions along which interest deductions can be limited. Clearly, countries have tightened limitations in ways other than the initial implementation of a maximum debtto-equity ratio or limits on the amount of interest that can be deducted, and it would be beneficial to capture that additional variation over time. It could also be informative to consider an earlier sample period, as many changes to interest deduction limitations occurred prior to 2006. Finally, there is likely a great deal of heterogeneity across firms in their ability to use different methods of profit shifting. Further work needs to be done to understand which multinationals shift profits and how they choose among different methods of shifting.
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